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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
VALGARDSON HOUSING SYSTEMS, 
INC. 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
oooOooo 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 920644-CA 
Priority No. 15 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES 
AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Statutes and rules which are determinative were set forth in 
Petitioner's original brief and in the brief of Respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The correct standard of review is correction of error as the 
Utah State Tax Commission has not been granted discretion to 
interpret the applicable law to its own liking. 
If the transactions in dispute here are wholesale sales of 
personal property, or building materials, to a dealer, who is the 
actual contractor, no tax is due at all from Petitioner, as it is 
a tax exempt transaction. In that case, the State Tax Commission 
should be seeking its tax from the dealer, not from Petitioner. 
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Public policy, the weight of authority, and the Commission's 
own rules, are in favor of Respondent's position that a sales tax 
in the disputed transactions is due only on the value of the 
materials used in construction of the housing unit. 
POINT I 
PETITIONER SET FORTH THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW IN 
THIS MATTER IN ITS ORIGINAL BRIEF. 
Petitioner in this action, in its original brief on appeal, 
referred to the Standard of Review set forth by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. Section 63-46b-16 U.C.A. states as 
follows: 
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; . . . . 
Respondent attempts to tilt the playing field in its direction 
by suggesting an alternative standard of review that would allow 
this Court to grant relief to the Petitioner only in the case of an 
abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by statute. In support 
of that alternative theory, Respondent cites the case of Morton 
International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Respondent, in doing so, has 
asked this Court to misread and misapply that Utah Supreme Court 
case. The Utah Supreme Court, n reviewing the Administrative 
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Procedure Act and the Standard of Review under the Act, stated: 
Therefore, in cases dealing with statutory construction, 
the Utah Administrative Procedure Act does not change the 
Standard of Review when the court is in as good a 
position as the agency to determine the issue or when the 
agency has been granted discretion in interpreting the 
statute. However, nothing in the language of section 63-
46b-16 or its legislative history suggests that an 
agency's decision is entitled to deference solely on the 
basis of agency expertise or experience. Indeed, there 
is no reference to agency expertise or experience in the 
statute or the statute's legislative history. Rather, in 
granting judicial relief when an "agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law," the language of section 
63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a grant of 
discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in 
reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a 
statutory term. 814 P.2d at 588 
The Utah Supreme Court, in further referring to the Standard 
of Review in cases such as the present one, stated as follows: 
However, it is clear from the wording of section 63-46b-
16 that an agency's statutory construction should only be 
given deference when there is a grant of discretion to 
the agency concerning the language in question, either 
expressly made in the statute or implied from the 
statutory language. 
The question presented is one of statutory construction 
or application, and absent a grant of discretion, the 
Commission's decision will be reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard. The statutory terms in 
question are of a specific nature and do not connote a 
general grant of discretion. 
It is apparent that the Commission has not been granted 
any discretion in regard to the present issue. 
Therefore, its interpretation will not be granted 
deference. 814 P.2d at 589. 
As in the Morton case, the Utah State Tax Commission is 
granted no discretion in interpreting the statutes at issue here. 
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Those statutes, § 59-12-102 and 103 set forth the basis of levying 
a sales tax on certain transactions, and then define in detail the 
terms used in the statute. No grant of discretion is made, either 
explicit or implied, to interpret the statute on its own without 
assistance from the courts of this state. Regarding the legal 
issues involved in this action, the "correction-of-error" standard 
should be applied. The Utah State Tax Commission has erroneously 
interpreted the statutes at issue here, and its decision should be 
reversed. 
The Supreme Court, in its analysis of the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the standard of review, referred to cases decided 
before the adoption of the Act. In doing so, the Court referred to 
instances where some deference had been granted to the decision of 
the agency: 
. . . when the agency#s experience or expertise puts the 
agency in a better position to resolve issues concerning 
the application of findings of fact to the legal rules 
governing the case and the interpretations of the 
operative positions of the statutes the agency is 
empowered to administer. 814 P.2d at 586. 
As referred to above, there is no language in the new Act 
which suggests such a continued deference. Additionally, public 
policy militates against giving such deference (or looking for a 
reason to find an implied grant of discretion) in a case such as 
this one. Most government agencies subject to review in this Court 
regulate certain specified activities. Most such agencies have no 
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particular reason to favor one point of view over the other, and to 
"skew" a statute in favor of one party. The Utah State Tax 
Commission, of course, is in a unique position. The reason for 
establishing the Utah State Tax Commission is to collect revenue. 
The bias of the Commission is inherent. Any ruling made in behalf 
of a taxpayer cuts down on the ability of the Commission to raise 
revenue. Any decision by an administrative law judge, which is 
subject to approval by the Utah State Tax Commission, pits the 
Commission itself against the taxpayer. The function of the court 
in such an instance is to level the.playing field and make sure 
that the State Tax Commission does not confuse its revenue-raising 
function with its regulatory function. One function requires the 
State Tax Commission to be fair, while the very reason of the 
Commission's existence militates against such fairness. Granting 
deference to the Commission, as it has suggested, is an extremely 
poor public policy decision. A revenue-raising agency can only be 
kept on a balanced and fair course by a vigorous review of its 
decisions by the courts. 
Respondent has also cited a recent case from this court, 
Putvin v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 920329CA, slip op. (Utah 
App. September 1, 1992) for the proposition that Respondent has 
considerable discretion in interpreting certain parts of the Tax 
Code. That case can be readily distinguished from the present one. 
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The court there found that certain terms had not been defined by 
the legislature, and that there was an absence of discernable 
legislative history regarding those terms. The court also found 
that the Commission had previously defined the terms itself in 
detailed rules which it was following in the Putvin action. In 
this action, the terms at issue have been carefully defined by the 
legislature. Additionally, there have been no additional 
definitions in the rules promulgated by the Tax Commission, which 
assist the Commission in making the determination it has made. In 
fact, the Commission has violated its own rules and attempted to 
stretch and distort the normal reading of statutes to fit its own 
special interests. This is not what the Utah Supreme Court had in 
mind in its decision in the Morton case, and it is, not what this 
Court had in mind in applying that case in Putvin. 
POINT II 
THE TYPE OF SALE RESPONDENT ARGUES IN ITS BRIEF IS NOT A 
RETAIL SALE AS DEFINED BY THE CODE, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
SALES TAX AT ALL. 
Discussion in front of the Utah State Tax Commission focused 
on whether or not a sale of property by Petitioner was the sale of 
personal property or of real property. Petitioner claimed that it 
was the sale of real property, because the items which were sold, 
while still on the crane, were finished housing units which were 
converted into real property immediately upon the crane depositing 
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those housing units on prepared foundation. Testimony was that the 
housing units were attached to the crane with steel bands, which 
bands were snipped off immediately upon depositing the home. 
Without the bands, the house could not be moved. Within an hour or 
two thereafter, the house was nailed to the foundation, and became 
totally permanent. 
The discussion did not deal with, in any depth, the question 
of the nature of the sale from Valgardson to the dealer, and from 
the dealer to the ultimate consumer, the owner of the property. 
The ruling of the Utah State Tax Commission did refer to a 
"sale" of the personal property by Valgardson to the dealer. It is 
only, however, in the brief of the Respondent, that the "sale and 
resale" transaction takes on significance. Respondent now makes it 
clear that the tax commission considers there to be two separate 
sales. On page 13 of Respondent#s brief, it states: 
Valgardson sells its modular units to dealers who are 
responsible for linking the units together and affixing 
the units to a foundation. The dealers then sell the 
completed home to purchasers. 
By emphasizing that there are, in fact, two sales in a very 
short period of time, Respondent has changed the whole complexion 
of this case. The argument in front of the Utah State Tax 
Commission primarily concerned whether the sale was of tangible 
personal property as defined by § 59-12-102(13)(a) U.C.A. or 
whether it is a sale of an interest in real estate, which is not 
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taxable, pursuant to § 59-12-102(13)(b)(i) U.C.A. The argument now 
shifts to whether or not this was a retail sale as defined by § 59-
12-102(8) and (9) U.C.A. A retail sale is defined by those 
sections as a sale which is "not for resale." 
Petitioner acknowledges Rule R865-19-58S of the Administrative 
Rules of the Utah State Tax Commission which states, in part: 
A. Sale of tangible personal property to real property 
contractors and repairmen of real property is generally 
subject to tax. 
That rule, however, goes on to state: 
1. The person who converts the personal property into 
real property is the consumer of the personal property 
since he is the last one to own it as personal property. 
Ordinarily, that would mean that the sale from Petitioner to 
the dealer of tangible personal property would be a taxable 
transaction, and
 # that Valgardson would be responsible for 
collection and payment of a full sales tax if the transaction is 
deemed to have been a sale of tangible personal property. In 
actual practice, however, a real estate contractor purchases 
building materials in a tax exempt transaction, in bulk. It is 
only when he sells the finished product, as part of real estate, 
that he determines the amount of materials actually used in that 
housing unit and is responsible for remitting the tax on the 
building materials used in that unit. (See Stipulated Facts Nos. 
23, 24 and 25, and Additional Stipulated Facts Nos. 1 and 2, both 
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of which are attached Petitioner's original brief). In other 
words, if the disputed transactions are a sale of improvements on 
real property, it is Respondent's duty to collect and pay the tax 
on the building supplies consumed in that housing unit, upon sale 
of the unit. If the sale is of tangible personal property 
(building materials) to a dealer who is a real estate contractor, 
it is a tax exempt transaction, and the determination and payment 
of the tax owed is up to the dealer. In that case, Petitioner has 
vastly overpaid taxes to the State Tax Commission and this Petition 
for redetermination should not only be upheld, but a substantial 
refund should be ordered. The State Tax Commission, in its mad 
rush to collect as much tax as possible, has changed the nature of 
the transaction and "shot itself in the foot". The Tax Commission 
simply cannot have it both ways. If Petitioner is a real estate 
contractor, as he claims, he pays taxes on 50% of the sale (the 
value of materials in the completed housing unit as set forth in 
stipulated facts No. 23 - 25). If Petitioner is determined to be 
a wholesaler of housing materials, the State Tax Commission is 
simply talking to the wrong person. This is an exempt transaction 
and the sales tax should be collected from the dealer. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO REASONABLY APPLY WHAT DISCRETION 
IT HAS, AND HAS VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES. 
Respondent has, in its brief, cited some dubious authority for 
its position in this action. Several of the so-called citations of 
authority are "private letters". Those letters are exactly what 
they say: private. They are in the form of letters to a 
particular person giving an informal opinion as to what tax 
ramifications certain transactions might have in other states. The 
letters are complete with blank spaces or asterisks where the names 
of private individuals seeking legal advice were once inserted. 
Respondent does not doubt that, given a particular situation, a 
staff attorney for a tax commission in Illinois or Massachusetts 
might offer some valid advice. If counsel for the State Tax 
Commission in this action were asked for his private opinion, he 
would obviously state that the transactions at issue here are 
taxable at 100% of the value of the sale. He would be entitled to 
his private opinion; but he would be wrong. His opinion would have 
absolutely no authority in a court of law in this state, and 
obviously would have none in an appellate tribunal of another 
state. If the legislature had determined that a staff attorney 
working for the Utah State Tax Commission could determine on his 
own what taxes should be paid, it would not have granted Petitioner 
the right to bring this case to the court system. 
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Additionally, some of the authorities cited by Respondent are 
in Petitioner's favor. A case in point is the ruling of the 
Virginia Department of Taxation included in Respondent's materials. 
In fact, a careful reading of the Virginia ruling is that the 
modular builder in that action is deemed to be a real estate 
contractor and is required to pay sales tax on the value of the 
materials used to construct the building. That is exactly what 
Petitioner has offered to do, and is the correct position to take. 
Respondent has cited the Iowa Supreme Court case of Sturtz v. 
Iowa Department of Revenue, 373 N.W.2d at 134 (Iowa 1985). Once 
again, this case substantiates the position of Petitioner. The 
actual dispute was over whether a sales tax or a use tax should be 
levied on a sale of a modular home built in Wisconsin and sold in 
Iowa. Harold Sturtz was not the manufacturer of the housing, but 
was the equivalent of the "dealer" in the transactions at issue 
here. It is obviously interesting to note that Pittsville Homes, 
Inc., the manufacturer of the homes, was not a party to the action. 
The Iowa Supreme Court first reviewed the reason for setting up the 
sales tax law as it had been enacted: 
A special rule, however, applies to sales of building 
materials to 'contractors' ,— which the director, on 
substantial evidence, found that Sturtz was. . . . The 
reason for this rule is that contractors turn building 
materials into real estate, and problems may arise as to 
whether the ultimate customer would be liable for sales 
tax. . . . Indeed the Department does not argue that the 
Sturtz - customer sales are subject to sales tax. 373 
11 
N.W.2d at 134. 
As set forth by the Iowa Supreme Court, the reason for taxing 
transactions in the way they are taxed is simple. Building 
materials are to be taxed on their value before being put into the 
finished home. Because the actual sale of a finished home is not 
subject to sales tax, the value of the materials used in producing 
that home are taxed. While it is theoretically the sale of the 
building materials to the contractor that is taxed, it is actually 
the contractor who determines the amount of, and pays, that tax. 
Once again, that has been the Petitioner's position all along. 
Respondent has cited the Georgia Supreme Court case of Adrian 
Housing Corporations v. Collins. 319 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. 1984). While 
that case does appear to support Respondent's position herein, it 
can certainly be distinguished. The Georgia Supreme Court, over 
the dissent of two justices, found a taxable transaction between 
two separate corporations owned by the same principals, when a 
manufacturer of modular homes sold the homes to the second company 
for delivery. The Georgia Supreme Court found that at the time of 
sale, "the modules are half units on Gillis' flatbed trailers 
waiting to be moved to a purchaser's lot by Gillis, and are 
properly considered tangible personal property." 319 S.E.2d at 
855. In the instant case, Petitioner delivers the units to the 
lot, puts them on the crane, and actually begins the process of 
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affixing the homes to the property. Thus, Petitioner in this 
instance is much closer to the actual real estate construction than 
was Adrian. The opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court is poor 
public policy, and it should not be followed. 
Respondent, in its very weak survey of other state decisions, 
has failed to >cite the case of Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. 
Sterling Custom Homes Corporation, 283 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1979). In 
that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did see the nature of the 
transaction. In a well-reasoned opinion, the court stated: 
In reaching our conclusion that Sterling Homes was a 
contractor and a consumer of the goods, we look to the 
general scope of its activities in its home-construction 
enterprise. 283 N.W.2d at 574. 
The facts of the Wisconsin case were almost identical to the 
present facts: 
When the foundation was completed and the builder was 
ready to erect the house, the taxpayer loaded the 
components in the sequence that conformed to the order 
that the components would be used at the job site. The 
components were delivered to the job site by the tax 
payer/s trucks and drivers. At the job site, the larger 
components were unloaded by crane. The crane operators 
were hired by the builder, but were usually selected by 
one of the tax payers sales man. . . . Although the 
drivers' only defined on-site responsibility was to keep 
a report and respect to the erection, they often helped 
or supervised, because they were very familiar with the 
process. 283 N.W.2d at 574-5. 
The court went on to say: 
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The taxability of the transaction transferring the 
components to the builder is dependent on whether 
Sterling Homes was engaged in "real property construction 
activities." If Sterling Homes was engaged in such an 
activity, than it is a contractor or a subcontractor and 
is a consumer of the tangible personal property used in 
real property construction activities and the sales tax 
applies to transfers to Sterling Homes and not by it. 
The facts demonstrate that, in all respects but one, the 
taxpayer was engaged in • real property construction 
activities. The lone exception is that Sterling Homes 
conducted its construction activities at a factory, 
rather than at the building site. The tax payer used the 
materials it purchased for only a single purpose — to 
construct custom-designed homes to be assembled at 
predetermined locations on foundations which were 
specifically designed for the prefabricated components. 
The components thus assembled were consumed by the very 
process of fabrication, for which they would be useless 
in their fabricated form except for the very building for 
which designed. 
The distinction between on-site and off-site construction 
of the components is not a criterion upon which the 
legislature has hinged the question of taxability. 
Rather, taxability is to be determined by whether or not 
the tax payer is engaged in 'real property construction 
activities.' The record leaves no doubt that Sterling 
Homes was so engaged. 283 N.W.2d at 575. 
It appears that the Utah Supreme Court has adopted similar 
reasoning to that of the Wisconsin Court, in the very recent case 
of Chicago Bridge v. State Tax Commission. 196 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18 
(Utah 1992). The court stated: 
In effect, a real property contractor is treated as a 
consumer for sales tax purposes. 
The reason for this rule is that materials which are 
purchased and then converted into real property would 
escape the sales tax because a sales tax is not imposed 
on the sale of real property. Real property contractors 
14 
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Mrs. Mary T. Noonan 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: Valgardson Housing Systems, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Commissionf Case No. 920644-CA 
Dear Mrs. Noonan: 
This letter is being written pursuant to Rule 24(i) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. On page 17 of Respondent's 
Brief is a citation to an unpublished opinion of the State of New 
York Tax Appeals Tribunal, purportedly in support of Respondent's 
position. The entire opinion of the Tax Appeals Tribunal is 
included in an addendum to Respondent's Brief. 
Please be advised that this decision was annulled by the New 
York Supreme Court — Appellate Division on November 25, 1992. 
This will be a published opinion, but since it is not yet 
published, I am enclosing a copy of the opinion of the Appellate 
Division with this letter. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely yours, 
W. Andrew McCullough J 
(Also admitted in New York) 
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cc: Valgardson Housing Systems 
Clark L. Snelson 
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In the Matter of LAKE CITY 
MANUFACTURED HOUSING INC. 
et al., 
Petitioners, 
V OPINION AND JUDGMENT 
STATE OF NEW YORK TAX 
APPEALS TRIBUNAL et al., 
Respondents. 
Calendar Date: October 13, 1992 
Before: Mikoll, J.P., Crew III, Mahoney, Casey and Harvey, JJ. 
Blinkoff, Viksjo, Robinson & Saeli (Joseph F. Saeli Jr. of 
counsel), Buffalo, for petitioners. 
Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Daniel Smirlock of counsel), 
Albany, for Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of the State of 
New York, respondent. 
Casey, J. 
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this 
court pursuant to Tax Law § 2016) to review a determination of 
respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal which sustained a sales and use tax 
assessment imposed under Tax Law articles 28 and 29. 
Petitioner Lake City Manufactured Housing Inc. (hereinafter 
petitioner) is a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the business 
of manufacturing modular homes. During the relevant audit period, 
85 modular homes manufactured by petitioner were sold in New York. 
Based upon an audit of petitioner's invoices for the 85 sales, the 
State Department of Taxation and Finance concluded that 23 sales 
for which a "roll-on" or installation charge was included on the 
invoice were exempt from sales tax under Tax Law S 1115 (a) (17), 
but were subject to use tax under Tax Law § 1110. The remaining 62 
sales for which no "roll-on" charge was shown on the invoice were 
determined to be subject to sales tax. Notices of deficiency were 
issued and petitioner initiated the administrative appeal process. 
-2- 65446 
At the hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
ALJ), the Department conceded that, pursuant to Matter of Morton 
Bldgs. v £hu (126 AD2d 828, affd on mem below 70 NY2d 725), 
petitioner owed no use tax. After hearing the testimony of the 
sales tax auditor who conducted the field audit and petitioner's 
president, the ALJ sustained the determination that 62 of the 85 
sales were subject to sales tax. Respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal 
(hereinafter respondent) sustained the ALJ's determination, 
resulting in this proceeding to review respondent's determination. 
Tax Law & 1115 (a) (17) provides an exemption from sales tax 
for fl[t]angible personal property sold by a contractor, 
subcontractor or repairman to a person * * * for whom he is adding 
to, or improving real property, property or land by capital 
improvement, or for whom he is about to do the foregoing, if such 
personal property is to become an integral part of such structure, 
building or real property". It is undisputed that in each of the 
sales, the modular home manufactured by petitioner was permanently 
installed on the customer's land and constituted a capital 
improvement (see. Tax Law former S 1101 [b] [9]). The critical 
issue in dispute at the administrative proceeding was whether 
petitioner not only sold the tangible personal property, but also 
installed it on the customer's land. According to respondent's 
interpretation of Tax Law S 1115 (a) (17), petitioner's sales are 
exempt if petitioner installed the modular homes, but the sales are 
taxable if petitioner did not install the modular homes. We see 
nothing irrational in this interpretation, which accords plain 
meaning to the statutory language. 
On the issue of whether petitioner was the installer as well 
as the seller of the modular homes, respondent made the following 
relevant findings. Petitioner sold its modular homes through 
dealers or realtors who would accompany the customer to the 
customer's site to determine whether a modular home could be 
installed on the site. Petitioner would then custom build a 
modular home using the customer's design. The sections of the home 
were shipped to the customer's site, with petitioner making all of 
the arrangements for shipping. Upon arrival at the site, the 
sections were unloaded from the truck, assembled and permanently 
installed on a foundation. The "roll-on" crew which performed the 
installation work was W.D. Construction, and in every instance 
petitioner contacted W.D. Construction to arrange and schedule 
installation. 
A "roll-on" charge was listed on the customer invoice in 
instances where the installer had inspected the site and advised 
petitioner what the charge would be. When the installer had not 
inspected the site or there were conditions at the site which might 
require extra work, no "roll-on" charge was listed on the invoice. 
Because the invoice accompanied the home to the site, W. D. 
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Construction sent its bill for installation services to the dealer 
when no "roll-on" charge was listed on the invoice. Petitioner 
maintained insurance on each home until it was permanently 
installed on its foundation, at which point title passed from 
petitioner to the customer. 
Respondent concluded that in the absence of a 
contractor-subcontractor relationship between petitioner and the 
installer (W. D. Construction), petitioner did not both sell and 
install the modular home and, therefore, was not entitled to the 
exemption. In so doing, respondent rejected the testimony of 
petitioner's president that W. D. Construction was its 
subcontractor because of the absence of supporting documentation. 
The determination must be annulled as irrational and lacking in 
evidentiary support in the record. 
Respondent's determination that no contractor-subcontractor 
relationship existed between petitioner and W. D. Construction is 
in direct conflict with the Department's conclusion that 23 of 
petitioner's sales were exempt under Tax Law § 1115 (a) (17). 
Inasmuch as W. D. Construction was the installer in each of those 
sales, it is clear that there was in fact a 
contractor-subcontractor relationship between petitioner and W. D. 
Construction for at least 23 sales and, therefore, we are of the 
view that respondent's finding of no contractor-subcontractor 
relationship in the 61 disputed sales cannot stand in the absence 
of evidentiary support in the record establishing a rational basis 
for the disparate treatment of the sales. 
The Department relied exclusively upon the presence or absence 
of a "roll-on" charge on the invoice to determine whether a sale 
was exempt or taxable. Respondent agreed and also noted that for 
the 61 disputed sales petitioner was not billed for the 
installations and did not pay for them. Thes<* facts do not justify 
the disparate treatment accorded to petitioner's sales. The 
relationship between and among petitioner, W. D. Construction, the 
dealer and the customer was the same for all the sales: the dealer 
acted as petitioner's agent in effecting the sale to the customer 
and W. D. Construction installed the modular homes at petitioner's 
request. Regardless of whether a "roll-on" charge was listed on 
the invoice, installation of the modular home was an integral part 
of each sale, which was not completed by the passing of title to 
the customer until the home was installed. Neither the customer 
nor the dealer played any role in the installation of the modular 
homes. Petitioner arranged and scheduled the installation with W. 
D. Construction, and petitioner controlled the manner in which W. 
D. Construction installed the homes. When asked about petitioner's 
control over W. D. Construction's work, petitioner's president 
explained: 
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Well, there are certain things that are 
unique to every different manufacturer's 
home. And we have instructed him on how we 
want the house set and erected, how the roof 
goes. He's aware of all these things that 
are unique to our house. * * * 
The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that the 
relationship among the relevant parties, including petitioner and 
W. D. Construction, was the same, regardless of whether a "roll-on" 
charge was listed on the invoice. The mere fact that W. D. 
Construction sent its bill to the dealer instead of petitioner does 
not alter the relationship. The invoices in the record are 
addressed to the dealer. Thus, regardless of whether the 
installation fee is included in the invoice or billed directly by 
W. D. Construction, the dealer receives the bill for installation. 
It is apparent that in most cases both the shipping fee and 
installation fee, along with various options and extras selected by 
the customer, are separately stated items included in the total 
price paid by the customer, regardless of whether the installation 
fee is included as a "roll-on" charge on the invoice addressed to 
the dealer or is billed directly to the dealer by W. D. 
Construction. 
The irrationality of determining petitioner's eligibility for 
an exemption based upon the presence or absence of a "roll-on" 
charge on the invoice for a particular sale is confirmed by the 
record. During the hearing, petitioner conceded that three of its 
sales of modular homes in New York during the audit period were 
sales of tangible personal property. All three sales were to a 
dealer in the Town of Cairo, Greene County, where the modular homes 
apparently were temporarily assembled as displays. Two of those 
sales, however, were included in the 23 sales which the Department 
had ruled exempt from sales tax (and later conceded were not 
subject to use tax) because a "roll-on" charge was listed on the 
invoices. As a result of the taxing authority's reliance upon the 
presence or absence of a "roll-on" charge to determine whether a 
sale was exempt, clearly a matter of form over substance, two sales 
which concededly should not have been exempt were exempted. 
In conclusion, we note that this is not a case where 
respondent's determination rests on an assessment of the 
credibility of the testimony of petitioner's president that W. D. 
Construction was petitioner's subcontractor for the installation of 
modular homes in New York. Rather, the issue is whether the 
evidence in the record provides a rational basis for respondent's 
determination that although some of petitioner's sales in New York 
were exempt from sales tax, others were not exempt. In the absence 
of any evidence in the record that petitioner's relationship with 
W. D. Construction differed from sale to sale, there is no basis 
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for according different tax treatment to those sales. The 
determination must, therefore, be annulled. 
Mikoll, J.P., Crew III, Mahoney and Harvey, JJ., concur, 
ADJUDGED that the determination is annulled, with costs, and 
petition granted. 
ENTER: 
Michael J. Novack 
Clerk 
are therefore considered the consumers because their 
purchases of materials that are incorporated into real 
property are the last transactions in which those 
materials can be subjected to the sales tax. 
The test for determining whether a person is a real 
property contractor is based not only on who converts 
tangible personal property into real property, but also 
on the nature of the transaction. 196 Adv. Rep. at 20. 
The Supreme Court went on to cite the earlier case of 
Nickerson Pump and Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission, 361 P.2d 
520 (Utah 1961) in which a manufacturer and installer of pumps on 
real property was determined not to be a real property contractor 
because the pumps were removable and were to be used at different 
locations. The court there found that the primary agreement was 
for the assembling of the pumps, and that installation in a 
specific place, which was temporary, was incidental to the 
contract. Obviously, none of those items are present in the 
instant case. This transaction is for the installation of a 
permanent housing unit, and, to reiterate the position of the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
The test for determining whether a person is a real 
property contractor is based not only on who converts 
tangible personal property into real property but also on 
the nature of the transaction, id. 
The Chicago Bridge case went on to determine that the large 
tanks manufactured by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company in Utah 
were for permanent installation, and therefore made the Chicago 
Bridge and Iron Company a real property contractor even though the 
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*materials were not installed in the State of Utah. It is 
interesting to note that the Utah State Tax Commission took exactly 
the opposite position in that case that it takes here. Once again, 
the State Tax Commission cannot have things both ways. Petitioner 
is a real property contractor and should be taxed as one. 
Rather than looking at technicalities, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court looked at the totality of the transaction. It saw the 
transaction for what it was, the construction of an improvement to 
real property. This appears to be the position of the Utah Supreme 
Court, as well. This is the only reasonable interpretation of the 
transaction as a whole, and it is the reasoning of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court that should be upheld. It is just that reasoning 
that is apparent in Rule R 865-19-58S.A.3 which was cited in 
Petitioner's original brief, and which specifically states that 
"the sale of a completed home or building is not subject to the 
tax, . . . ." The Utah State Tax Commission should be required to 
live up to the spirit and the clear meaning of its own rule. 
Petitioner once again directs the attention of the court to 
the Administrative Rules of Colorado and California (made part of 
the Addendum in Petitioner's main brief) which specifically tax 
sales of modular homes on the value of the materials in those 
modular homes, and set forth formulae very similar to the 50% 
formula set forth in the stipulated facts of these parties. 
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Respondent's contention that their view in this matter is the 
majority view is simply not supported by the facts. In fact, 
Respondent has changed its view several times since this action was 
commenced. Counsel for the tax commission has attempted to hold 
the transaction up to several different lights to find one that 
will support his position. He certainly has succeeded in confusing 
the issues. He has not succeeded in showing any authority or 
support for the peculiar meaning which his auditors have read into 
a statute which appears to speak for itself. The position of the 
Utah State Tax Commission in this matter not only flies in the face 
of the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, it is not a 
reasonable position. It is not a reasonable application of what 
discretion has been granted to the State Tax Commission. Thus, 
Petitioner should be granted the redetermination that it seeks, on 
the basis of whichever standard of review the Court determines 
should be applied. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner should be granted the relief requested in its 
original brief. / 
DATED this k
 d a y o f fl/bi/j-^ lo>~^~~ , 1992. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
W. Andrew McCullough (2170J 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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